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TAkU OF crirJTF:NTS 
, rl !'IL CASf, 
,,1,ilJrlN IN THE:: LOWE::R COURT 
~1 tlf TIH; RlcLIE::F SOUGHT 
J. THF PARTIES AND THE lJNUr:HLY!N(~ AGREEME::NT'.c'. 
<· THE ROGE::RS CLAIM. 
rHE CROSS CLAIM • 
.J. !Hf CONFLICTS OF INTERfST. 
fHf TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING BITNER CO. 
JlrJNILY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH Wt:STCOR, 
WIN SUN AND BADGER FOR DAMAGES Tri ROc,ERS. 
<.;1nce 81tner Co. never dealt directly >1it'1 
!·' 'cJers, it could be liable ocily u;:ion a J'Jtnt 
\'t-'r:ture theory. Such a theur1 WdS not proven. 
A. THE FACTS DO NOT SHOW A JOINT VENTLJPf:, OF 
INTENT BETWEEN BITNER CO. AND WESTCOR-
MCJNSON AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
No document or action demonstrates an 
intent by Bitner Co. to enter into a 
Joint venture >1ith Westcor nr anyone else. 
The underlyiny ayreement >1as a uniform real 
estate contract het>1een R1tner Co. as seller 
of the land and Westcor as the purchaser 
that intended to develop the land. 
The situation does not meet the ]Dint 
venture standards recognized by this Court. 
llettenson v. Call Auto Equipment Sales, Tnc., 
645 P. 2d 684 (Utah 1Q82); Bassett v. Baker, 
'>30 P. 2d 1 (Utah lg74). 
j. THERF WAS NO ELEMENT OF LOSS. 
H1tr1~r Co.'s rt::'al es~atr· s~l~s crJntr·~ct 
was <..'r1tnrceatile a._Ja1nst Wt::'St _-( !"' whether 
r n () t We s t r l t" s t ,, n 1 t s , J ,, '.' e 1 c) t-.im e n t 
~) l ans. 
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2. THERE WAS NO PROFIT SHARING. 
Bitner Co. was entitled to its sales 
price. Its principal could earn money 
in his individual capacity by making 
referrals, but these would not inure to 
Bitner Co.'s benefit. 
3. BITNER CO. HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE 
DEVELOPMENT. 
All development was the responsibility 
of Westcor, and Bitner Co. had no 
management or other duties. 
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4. BITNER CO. DID NOT CONTROL THE FINANCES. 15 
Bitner Co. sold its land and had no 
influence (let alone control) over any 
funds Westcor might obtain or expenses 
it might incur in its development. 
5. THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS DISPROVE ANY 
JOINT VENTURE BY INTENT. 
The underlying documents do not set 
forth the elements of JOint venture or 
set up circumstances to permit a JOint 
venture. 
B. THERE IS NO CONCRETE AVERMENT NOR 
SUBSTANTIATED FINDING OF FACT WHICH 
WOULD ALLOW THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND A 
JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN BITNER CO. AND 
WESTCOR-MONSON AS TO ROGERS BY THE 
THEORY OF JOINT VENTURE BY ESTOPPEL 
TOWARD THIRD PARTIES. 
By their testimony, Rogers relied only on 
Westcor as its seller and the developer 
when Rogers decided to buy lots, build 
houses and obtain construction loans in 
hopes of selling the houses and lots at a 
profit. Rogers never knew Bitner Co. or 
relied on it when it embarked on its 
actions. Union Tank Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 
15 Ut. 2d 101, 387 P. 2d 1000 (Utah 1964). 
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C. THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT INTENDED THIRD 
PARTY BENEFICIARIES Of THE PURPORTED 
TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN BITNER CO. 
AND WESTCOR. 
When Bitner Co. attempted to resolve 
Westcor's breach to it, it did not in any 
document recognize any obligation to Roger 
or create a beneficiary situation for 
Rogers. See Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. 
first Seci::lr"lty Corp., 9 Ut. 2d 215, 341 
P. 2d 944 (1959), 
1. THE PURPORTED TRUST AGREEMENT WAS VOID 
FROM ITS INCEPTION DUE TO FAILURE OF A 
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT. 
Since Westcor failed to do anything the 
condition subsequent essential to the 
trust agreement was never made, making 
that agreement a nullity. 
2. EVEN IF THE TRUST AGREEMENT IS NOT NULL 
AND VOID, THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE HOLD 
HARMLESS CLAUSE COULD NOT EXCULPATE 
WESTCOR AND MONSON FROM THEIR OWN 
WRONGFUL AND FRAUDULENT ACTS. 
Even if the trust ageement were not a 
nullity, hold harmless clauses cannot 
be enforced to cover fraud. Lamb v. 
Bangart, 525 P. 2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
3. EVEN If THE TRUST AGREEMENT WERE VALID 
(WHICH BITNER CO. DOES NOT CONCEDE), 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, INTENDED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES 
Of THAT CONTRACT WHO COULD DIRECTLY 
ENFORCE THE HOLD HARMLESS CLAUSE OF 
THE TRUST AGREEMENT AGAINST BITNER CO. 
Even if the trust agreement were valid 
and were to construed to cover fraudulent 
conduct, the agreement does not make 
Rogers an intended beneficiary with an 
enforceable claim against Bitner Co. 
Rogers is at most an incidental benefi-
ciary. Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 
21 Ut 2d 418, 446 P. 2d 414 (Utah 1968). 
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4. THE TRUST AGREEMENT AND THE JOINT 
VENT~RE THEORY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
ANY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL THEORY. 
An action to require improvements to 
be made pursuant to an escrow agree-
ment with Summit County does not snow 
that Bitner Co. could be held liable 
to Rogers for alleged consequential 
damages. 
ll. IF, AS THE TRIAL COURT FOUND, ROGERS IS A 
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE ESCROW 
AGREEMENT, ROGERS' RIGHTS OF ENFORCEMENT 
UNDER THAT AGREEMENT ARE ONLY EQUAL TO 
THOSE OF SUMMIT COUNTY AND DO NOT EXTEND 
TO AN ACTION FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
The escrow agreement, like any other 
agreement, does not confer greater benefits 
nn a third party beneficiary than it does 
upon the promisee. Rogers thus cannot 
obtain consequential damages not 
provided for in the agreement. Moreover, 
Rogers is not in the category of bene-
f 1ciar1es that could have been contem-
plated by the escrow agreement since Rogers' 
improvements were completed at no cost to 
itself. See, Continental Bank and Trust 
Company v-:---R.w. Stewart, 4 Ut.2d 228, 291 
P.2d 890 (Utah 19551. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING 
DAMAGES TO ROGERS. 
If, despite all the above, Bitner Co. 
is held liable to Rogers, Rogers must 
calculate damages on the basis of 
his own bargain and cannot promote them. 
T~E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING BITNER CO. 
:tl!NTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DEFENDANTS 
WESTCOR, MONSON AND BADGER TO BENNETT. 
since Bennett had a preexisting loan to Badger 
an~ then loaned mr•ney to Westcor so Westcor 
•··,utd eventually be able to repay him for 
1 .. ,th sums, and since Bitner Co. had no part 
1n ~1ther transaction, there was no basis 
t•'r t ind1n•J Bitner Co. to be a JOlnt venturer 
as to Bennett's loans. The cases and arguments 
'incerninc.J ioint venture set forth in Section 
IA are inccq.hirated here as to Bennett's claim. 
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~. THERE WAS NO JOINT VENTURE OF INTENT. 
Relying on the legal arguments made 
with regard to JOlnt venture on the 
Rogers claim, Bitner Co. emphasizes 
that Bennett had even less basis to 
claim a Joint venture than did Rogers. 
B. THERE WAS NO JOINT VENTURE BY ESTOPPEL 
TOWARD THIRD PARTIES IN REGARD TO BENNETT. 
Bennett, a sophisticated businessman, 
took care to know the parties to his 
transaction and to get their signatures. 
He never relied on Bitner Co. in making 
his loans and had no knowledge, experience 
or reason to rely on Bitner Co. 
C. EVEN IF A FORMAL JOINT VENTURE BASED ON 
THE DOCUMENTS COULD RE FOUND, THERE IS 
NO EVIDENCE OR FINDING THAT WESTCOR, 
MONSON AND BADGER WERE ACTING IN BEHALF 
OF SUCH AN ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE WHEN 
THEY OBTAINED A LOAN FROM BENNETT. 
Even if Bitner Co. was involved in any 
kind of Joint venture with Westcor, 
that joint venture did not deal with 
Bennett in obtaining the Bennett loan. 
D. EVEN IF AN ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE 
INCLUDING BITNER CO. DID EXIST, THE 
ACTIONS OF WESTCOR, MONSON AND 
BADGER IN RELATION TO BENNETT WERE, 
BY STATUTE, NOT ACTIONS OF THAT 
JOINT VENTURE. 
Under the Uniform Partnership Law, U.C.A. 
§48-l-6(3)a, all of the partners must 
authorize an assignment of partnership 
assets in trust for creditors. Bennett 
received such an assignment from Westcor, 
Monson and Badger: to comply with the law, 
Bennett must admit that he had dealt with 
all partners and that Bitner Co. was not 
one of them. 
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E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING BENNETT 
TO BE A DIRECT THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
UNDER THE TRUST AGREEMENT AMONG BITNER 
CO., WESTCOR AND MONSON. 
Bennett was even more remote from the 
trust agreement than was Rogers; his 
loans could not be encompassed 1n the 
agreement in order to make him into 
an intended beneficiary. Schwinghammer 
v. Alexander, supra and the arguments 
in Section IC3 above. 
F. EVEN IF BENNETT WERE AN INTENDED THIRD 
PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT 
(WHICH HE IS NOT), HE COULD NOT ENFORCE 
THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT IS 
SPECIFICALLY UNENFORCEABLE BY WESTCOR 
OR MONSON AS TO THEIR OBLIGATION TO 
BENNETT. 
As with the Rogers, when a party has 
committed fraud (as did Westcor), 1t 
cannot by contract place liability 
for its fraud upon anyone else. 
Bennett's remedy for the fraud of 
Westcor, Monson and Badger 1s against 
them directly, not by way of a contract 
clause whose enforcement would violate 
public policy. Lamb v. Bangart, supra. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING 
BITNER CO. JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY 
LIABLE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $10,000.00 TO BENNETT, 
EVEN IF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
IS UPHELD AS TO THE REST OF BENNETT'S 
CLAIM. 
Even if Bitner Co. could somehow be 
held liable to Bennett despite the 
foregoing, Bitner Co., which did not 
directly commit fraud, should not be 
liable for punitive damages arising 
from the direct and specific fraud 
of Westcor, Monson and Badger. 
Likewise, an award of an attorney's 
fee against Bitner Co. 1s inappropriate. 
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·11. TH~ TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS 
FOR A MISTRIAL MADE BY DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL 
JOHNS. DAVIS WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT HE, 
AS COllNSt:L, COULD NOT ADEQUATELY REPRESENT 
BITNER CO. AND WESTCOR AND MONSON BECAUSE OF 
SERIOUS AND COMPELLING CONFLICT OF INTEREST. 
Bitner Co.'s former counsel Johns. Davis 
undertook representation of parties whose 
interests were in direct and obvious 
conflict so that he was unable to represent 
each adequately. Although recognizing the 
severe problem, the trial court refused 
to remedy the problem on Davis' repeated 
motions for mistrial or a new trial. As 
an alternative, the Court should grant 
Bitner Co. a new trial on any issues 
not resolved in its favor on this appeal. 
u.R. Civ. P. Rule 61, Disciplinary Rules 
5-102, 5-105. 
.".JNCLUS ION 
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BRIEF ON APPEAL OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT M.O. BITNER CO. 
NATUr<.: OF THE CASE 
Defendant-appellant appeals from an order and judgment after trial 
in the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County (per Wilkinson, J.) 
which awarded damages and other relief to plaintiffs and to cross-claimant on 
the theory that defendant-appellant was a joint venturer with certain other 
defendants. 
DISPOSITION JN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court found three defendants, including the defendant-
appellant, jointlv and severally liable to the plaintiffs for damages, costs 
and attorney's fees on the grounds, first, that the failure of certain of the 
defendants to provide improvements to Jots purchased by the plaintiffs had 
harmed the plaintiffs and, second, that the defendants against which the judg-
ment was so rendered were engaged in a joint venture. Jn the alternative, the 
court found, third, that the plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries of 
certain agreements between the defendant-appellant and the other defendants 
against whom liability was found directly. 
The trial court further found the defendants against whom the cross-
•!aim had been filed jointly and severally liable to the cross-claimant, the 
defendants other than the defendant-appellant directly liable to the cross-
claimant because of breach of contract and the defendant-appellant liable 
i'"''tly and severa•Jy on the grounds either that the defendant-appellant was 
'' 1olved in a joint venture with other defendants or that the cross-claimant 
;s a third party beneficiary of a hold harmless agreement between the defen-
dant-appellant and the defendants against which the cross-claimant had a 
"·\ '. L:k[ llF T Hl kl L ll c ':>ULICH T 
L R1•• 1•r..,,~, <1' ,, mdtt1-r- of !d'f'li, tilt' hold1n~J hv tht-> trial ( (H1' ! t· 
ttw pl.t1nt1f 1 ' dr-1• third ~,.1,-:, ht>nt>fll lor1t>' tif tht• holrl hdrmles<- l :d1,-
l1rf 1•111 ~dll t' 
"· 
ctqr1•t-'"11·nt 
), k1·\..t>rs1· d<.. ,1 .,.1ott,, (lf idl'\ trot· t• 1c1 
!' ,. d l' !'I' f"'"1 t 'I~ " 
ht• concer-necJ, 
F,. Rt->vt-'r-Se the jUd(jmt>ril f1nd1ny !ht- rit'ft-ncldnt a~pt>'lant 101ntly or-
'1., l1ohlt· to the rlefenrlants fur- tht· da.,.1a9 .... ~ cld1mt><1 or dwarrlerl to tht> 
,•1-.., or- 1n tht> altt:>r-natrve, r-ecalc u!ate Jnd reriu(e the rlamagec; a .... ardPrl 
,1,ntiff or ~lr-ant a ne~ trial on tht- 1c;,l,.. of 101nt vf"nture hy estoppt>I 
" r ._J ~drt1es, or 
, . In the alternative. grant d<>fen<1ant-appt'llant a nPw trial on 
'l1ff'~ ()dims because of conflictin9 tntt-rt:>sls ht>t'f'lreen it dn<i other defpn-
·., r·epresented by the same counsel. 
i-.ot.- The defenddnt aµµelldnt dO+-'s not appt""dl from that µortion of 
,.,<1,1ment which quieted titlt• to two lots for the pld1nt1ffs. 
"' to the finding for the cross-cla11Tl_<!12_!_5.. tn 
I. Reverse, as a matter of la". thP finrlir y of the trial court that 
· 'c existPd a 1oint venture by intent Detwepn the rlefenrldnt appellant anrl 
•ttwr rlefendants against which the cross-claim .. as brought. 
2. Reverst-, as a matter of fact ar;·-~ la...-. any finding hy the tr-ial 
t ti d t the defendant - a pp e 11 an t " Io n t I y and s e v <' r a 11 y I 1 ah 1.- to the 
~ la1mant on any theory arising out of 1Q1nt venture by estoppel as to 
µdr t I(' S, 
J, Find, as a matter of law, that the defendant-appellant had no 
dny lo;1n agreemPnt entered into by <.t-rta1n other defendants even 1f 
1,enture existed, that anv alle~led joint vpnftirt- 1nvolv1ny rlt->fenr1ant 
rrnt had no pdrt in the loan ag:--eement either- because of absenct' of 
~it->lwf'en the cross-claimant and that 101nt venture, or because the acts 
ther defendants wt>re, hy stat .. Jte, not acts ·1f the alleged 101nt 
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4. Find, as a matter of law, that the cross-claimant is not a thi" 
party beneficiary of the hold harmless clause in a trust agreement between the 
defendant-appellant and the other defendants cross-claimed against; 
5. Find, as a matter of law and equity, that the hold harmles< 
agreement as among the parties involved in the cross-claim is void as against 
public policy on the basis of fraud; 
6. Find, as a matter of law and equity, that the defendant-appel-
lant may not be held jointly and severally liable for punitive damages granted 
because of fraud, the trial court having specifically found that the defen-
dant-appellant did not participate in the fraud by the other defendants; 
7. Reverse as a matter of law the findings of the trial court that 
the defendant-appellant is liable for damages to the cross-claimant, either 
jointly or severally with the other defendants against whom the cross-claim 
has been brought. 
8. In the alternative, grant defendant-appellant a new trial on the 
cross-claim because of the conflicting interests between it ;ind other defen-
dants represented by the same counsel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Parties and the Underlying Agreements. 
The defendant-appellant M.O. Bitner Co. ("Bitner Co."), was the 
owner of the real estate which is, in part, the subject matter of this case 
and called Park Ridge Estates ("Park Ridge"). Bitner Co. 's principal ;, 
Blaine Bitner, who was one of the defendants ("Blaine Bitner"). 
By early 1978 Bitner Co. had planned and plotted a subdivision ""' 
had obtained preliminary approval for its development of Park Ridge fro1" 
Su mm it County. 
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On November 1, 1978, Bitner Co. entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract ("Real Est. Contract" l (Exhibit ["Ex."] 23P), which, together with 
certain exhibits attached to it, created an agreement with defendant Westcor, 
a corporation in formation ("Westcor"). Westcor's principal officer, owner 
"nd vice president was defendant Monson ("Monson"). Westcor's president, 
defendant Richard Johns 111, was not served in this action, and there is 
little evidence concerning his actions. The trial court found that Monson 
acted for Westcor and became its only principal. It thus treated the two as 
alter egos and referred to them interchangeably. (Findings of Fact and Law 
/"Findings"] Record ["R."] 787 #9) The record supports the trial court's 
determination of identity between Westcor and Monson and their interests. 
Under the Real Est. Contract, Bitner Co. agreed to sell Park Ridge 
and all rights and obligations of improvement in Park Ridge to Westcor for 
$400,000 and other consideration. An undated supplemental agreement was 
attached to the Real Est. Contract. (Ex. 23P) Under the supplementary pro-
visions, principals of Bitner Co. and Westcor could earn referral fees for 
each purchaser referred by them to Westcor for any of the lots in Park Ridge. 
These fees were payable to individuals and not to their respective companies. 
The Real Est. Contract provided that Westcor accepted all develop-
ment responsibility in Park Ridge and was to complete improvements within one 
year. If the development costs incurred by Westcor proved to be less than 
anticipated, Bitner Co. would receive an additional sum beyond the $400,000 
selling price. (Ex. 23P) 
Westcor arranged for an escrow agreement in favor of Summit County, 
quaranteeing completion of improvements within two years. Westcor also 
obtained Bitner Co.'s signature on that agreement, having informed Bitner Co. 
that it must sign the agreement as the selling land owner. (Transcript 
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("Tr."] 220-2) Westcor then filed the escrow agreement with the County (ti,. 
"Escrow Agreement") (Ex. 24P). The trial transcript indicates that the bcr,,. 
Agreement was extended, but no copy of the extended Escrow Agreement ""' 
entered into the record. 
Westcor, through real estate agents, the principals of Westcor anu 
Bitner Co. and otherwise, was able to sell all the lots in Park Ridge within, 
few months after the signing of the Real Est. Contract. All sales agreements 
were signed solely by Westcor (as seller), and all contract payments were to 
be made solely to Westcor. (See, Exs. 31D-36D, 400, 77D-88D) However, 
Westcor never funded the Escrow Agreement with Summit County as required by 
the Real Est. Contract. (Findings R. 770 #13) 
On or near August 29, 1979, Westcor contracted with Bitner Excav•-
tion Company, ("Excavation Co."), a Utah corporation existing separate! y and 
independently • rom Bitner Co., to install certain improvements in Park Ridge. 
(Tr. 223) However, Westcor did not pay Excavation Co. for work done, and when 
Westcor made payments by check for materials for the improvements, its checks 
failed to clear the bank. (Tr. 206) The trial court found that, except for 
paying for minimal amounts of materials, Westcor never made any effort tn 
fulfill its obligation to install the improvements at Park Ridge. 
R. 770 # 12) 
(Findings 
In the months following the signing of the Real Est. Contract, 
Westcor failed to fulfill its obligation to make improvements at Park Ridge. 
It also breached the Real Est. Contract by failing to make required payment, 
to Bitner Co. (Tr. 221-22) and even told some persons that it was no longer' 
part of the Park Ridge development. Faced with Westcor's breach and event<'· 
repudiation of the Real Est. Contract, Bitner Co. attempted to reach some k1r<' 
of resolution of its problems with Westcor and to recover the land. 
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On June 30, 1980, Bitner Co. and Westcor signed a Trust Agreement 
tEx. 28P l recognizing that Westcor had defaulted on the Real Est. Contract and 
returning all rights in the property to Bitner Co. The Agreement contained a 
Hold Harmless Clause from Bitner Co. to Westcor, subject to Westcor's com-
>1lying with certain requirements of the agreement (the "Trust Agreement" and 
the "Hold Harmless Clause"). 
Initial construction of the improvements to Park Ridge began in 
1979, but they were not completed until the summer of 1981, as was required in 
an extension of the escrow agreement with Summit County obtained by Bitner Co. 
in late 1980. 
2. The Rogers Claim. 
On April 18, 1978, the plaintiffs William Dean Rogers and Patricia 
Lee Rogers (collectively "Rogers") purchased two lots in Park Ridge through a 
real estate agent representing Westcor. The agent told Rogers that Westcor 
had represented to him that the improvements to Park Ridge would be completed 
by fall, 1979. Rogers purchased the lots, intending to build two homes on 
speculation anc to sell them for profit. (Findings, R. 772-74) 
In order to build the homes, Rogers obtained construction loans 
which were fully payable with interest in January, 1980. Rogers began to 
construct the homes in late spring, 1979. He alleges that the homes could 
have been finished and sold in 1979 if the improvements to Park Ridge had been 
.completed in 1979, but the construction itself was not completed in 1979. 
11.sJ.) 
Rogers further alleged that because the improvements were not com-
µleted, he was not able to sell the homes and therefore was not able to pay 
"'f the construction Joans. After having obtained a three month extension on 
-7-
thf' loans and still not hav1n~ sold the homes, Rogers convPrterl tht:-" lo,:ir1<... 
JO year mortgage' 1n or about April, 1980. (.!_d.) 
In tht' summer of 1980, Rogers found purchasers for both hnnu--., 1• 
entPrec1 into earnest money agreements to sell one home in July, 19811 1 
5130,000 and the other in September of 1980 for 5130,000 (hPreinaft., 
"EarnPst Money Agr_,,ents.") Those Agreements are not part of the re<orrl 
art' mentioned by the trial court in its Findings of Fact (Findings R. 77\1 
The Earnest Money Agrrements were subject to the completion of the impro·., 
ments, which, according to Rogers, were not completed while the Earnest Moc', 
Agreem .. nts were valid and binding on the prospective buyers, (0.) 
Rogers alleger1 that by late 1980, he was no longer able tu pd, fl;e 
mortgag<' payments on the two homes and was forced to avoid threatenPrl fore 
closure by agreeing to transfer all rights and obligations he had in the home' 
dnd property to the prospective buyers who had earlier signed the Earne" 
\4oney Ayrt>t>ments. Those buvers assumed the mortgages on the homes, line 
mortgage amounted to 5105,419,95 and the second amounted to 5106,689,111, 
Rog"" alleged that the difference between these loans assumed by the buve• • 
and the appra1Sed value at the time of the assumption of the mortgages by hi· 
buyers IS the measure of damages resulting from loss of contractural oppor 
tun 1l y. Tht' trial court found for Rogers on these allegations, 
775-76 #JOI 
Rogers also demanded that title to the lots he purchased in Pa•' 
R1d<Je be qu1<•ted. 1 he trial court's Judgment t0 quiet title is not chCJl!t>nlw 
in this appt>al, but B1tnpr Co. conSJders that quiet title claim rele· 
because the trial court found that the cloud on title arose from fra ',,,, 
actions by l\estcor and defendant Alonzo Badger I hereinafter "Badger" I. 
trial court also found that "l.estcor had taken a number of actions V'fhll h an11•' 
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• .wd by Westcor against Rogers by not funding the Esc >w Agreement and 
frau:-1 1r1 the actions by 1>estcor, Monson and Badger which clouded Rogers' 
(Findings R. 777 #34) 
Cros> Claim. ·------
As of August 2, 1979, Badger owerl defendant and cross-claimant 
··M•old H. Bennett ("Bennett") the sum of $81,078.00 plus interest. The reason 
,ir this debt is unstated, but the record is completely clear that the loan 
'"d debt had nothing to do v. Fark Ridge or with Bitner Co. Badger was the 
.,,,ncipal 1n the defunct company, Utah Security Mortgage. A, tnough the record 
. somewhat unclear, apparently Badger and Monson had agreed to participate 
'nc,cther in Westcor's development of Park R1dqe and in other activities the 
on men were engaged in. (See Findings R. 7lc #41) 
Shortly before August 2, 1979, Badger contacted Bennett and told 
nrnnett that if he would make a loan to Westcor, Westco' would assign him 
_nntract receivables from Park Ridge and Badger would ttwn sell the contract 
eceovables to a third party financial institution. The proposed assignment 
ie•d sale would allow Westcor and Badger to repay the $81,078.r'n Badger owed 
•,« to repay any new loan to be made by BennPtt to Westcor. bennett agreed tr. 
''"',e transaction. (_1_9. at ##36, 37) 
On August 2, 1979, Bennett made a loan of $50,000.00 to Westcor and 
.,ed a promissory note signed personally by Badger and b) ~onson as vice 
;ent of Westcor. (Ex. 72D) The note required the t._,,al amount of 
l•'B, the amount already owed by Badger and the $50,000.00 loaned tc 
to be paid to Bennett in full on or before November 30, 1979. ( _l_9. ) 
To secure payment on the note, Westcor assigned to Bennett contracts 
'eCP1vables on Park Ridge with a face value of $20P 348.48. 
"'''n. acting as and stating that they were a partnership, represented that 
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ttw lOntratt' or rt"'Ct"l"dhlt·' .,.ould tH· -.old tJ\. tht>m un twhalf of H1·11111 •t 
lif'nnf'tt •oulrl tht•n ht• rt"'pd1d from tht· pro<t•ed~ of thu">t' ~die~. or, thr1t 
altrrnd1t.._..,., Horir11·" 1llt· Thrift ( 1>n1p.ir1\., ct tompdfl\ o~nt·l1 dTld cuntr1): 
Bonr1t>V 1111 r 1 
{fHldllHJ' K. ,'c~ 11)9. 40. 41) Un 1nfurmdt1on anci belief, it wa~ tht· l.i1 
of 1nvt"it1y•t1on dnd ~uh\t•qut~nt legal µroceed1nys by Utdh State authur1t1t•'-. 
't\t>!ttlor rt:'µresenletl to 8ennett uµon bt>rrowing the money tt1dt 11, 
prOCf't-d~ (or dl lt~dst d pd rt of the µrot.Pt•ds) ~ere to funci ~estcor 1 ~ ohl1<:_Jd 
•h1rh d1rt·t ti-.· contraci1ct~ R. 779 •lt2. .~~onson test1f1erl that 11 somt>" ol 11 .. 
mont>y went into Pdrk R1cigt· hut did not rpmemher how much. Tr. 407) 
'It. ht•n 'It. e~tc or, Monson and 8adgt>r macje tht.' alleged ass19nmt'nt" 
1._untr•c t-. tu H.-nnt•tt tu cOYt:'r tht' Vdlue of the note, they asked Bennett not l 
obtain fund\ to ni->dy l:it•nnt_·lt. 
(f1ndllHJ' R. 781 1145d, h, t I 
Uenn+_·tt did not then n~rd those ass1qnmt>n!• 
At the t1mt' tht• d"'Si<Jnmpnl~ ""'t .. rt' be1ny macil' to Bennt>ll, at lt-·d-· 
It J , 
found thdl '.~on,rH1, 'ft ...... tt.ur <lnd Hd<1!Jt->r comrn1tt~·(: frdud a9a1n~t (:)ennt'tt " 
lht• lodn drrdnqt•mt>nl hd1~ tit•t·n md(it•, '>llH.t' on . .\u~;u ... t 31, 1979, w1lhtn }'< 
•f lt>r 't'.t~l(or. Mori~or1 dfld l-ldl19t"r hdd madt_• tht•1r lo.cm ayrt."'L•ment ~1th l'-1 
both "°'''§On cMH1 Lic)(..i~r mack- t•vt•n furttwr dS'>!SJnmt·nh ot lht:> contrdcts ttw. 
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l'it· ('onfl1cts of lntPrest. 
Throu9hout the trial 1n the µrest"nt (a~t> H!ain ... B1tnt"r, H1tnt>r Co., 
dfHl Monson wt"rt-' all represPnted bv anothPr <Jpfpnc1ant, John S. Ddvis 
,,"I, then a pract1c1ng membt>r cJ tht• IJtdh C,tat .. Bar. I~. ~g_.. Tr. 21 
"l'o rt•µresented himself. Davis also IPstif1erl at trial, havinq hf>Pn 
't->\1 t)y Rogers. (Tr. 1103 ~.} Davi~ madt> two motion~ on the recorc1 
d m"trial or for relief because of confl1< ts among himself and his other 
t'ril<;, on issue~ relating to the existen( .... of a 1oint venture among them as 
~o~ers and as to the Bt>nnt·tt loan. (Tr. 500, 896) Bitner Co. replaced 
n 1, de;, its counsel after the trial court had entered 1ts 1udgment. 
TH~ TklAL COURT ERRED IN FIND/NC. BITNER CO. JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE 
lllTH IHSTCOR MONSON AND BADGER FOR DAMAGES TO ROGERS. 
In order for Bitner Co. to be held liable to Royers, either 1ointly 
se. nallv, the trial court had to find as a mat:er of fact and law that 
ad an obliga:1on either 1ointl or severdlly to Roge,..s which 
~'1t·r (o. ~Jreached to the detriment of Roger~. In finrl1n9 such an obl19a-
tt1e trial court declared that there was a 1oint venturP between Bitner 
Ml<! l'.estcor and Monson, or that, in the alternative, Rogers was an inten-
• • thirc1 party benef;ciary of the Hold Harmless Clau'P in the Trust Agreement 
.,f the Escrow Agreement required bv Summit County. On this conclusion, 
'ri"I • ourt awardecJ Rogers damages against Bitner <o. for the las.es 
"'• •1. The trial court erred in all of these findings. 
l ~it· f.-1' ts do not show a joint ventun-" of 
I\. "'~l H or Monson as a matter of la._-.. 
intent bet,.een Bitner Co. anrl 
------ - - ------
This Court has staterl the essential elements for a 1oint venture hy 
', ''t 1n a numhpr of cases 
Thp requirements for the relationship ar-e not •·xactly defint:-d, 
hut _.s~~t_d~~_elemen~-~-~-~~~_en~l the parties must combine 
11 
their property, money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge. As 
a general rule, there must be a community of interest in the 
performance of a CX1111mon purpose, a joint proprietary interest in 
subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share in 
the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the cnntrary, a 
duty to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added). These standards 
were reaffirmed in Bettenson v. Call Auto and Eguipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.)rl 
684, 686 (Utah 1982). A number of the elements essential for finding a joint 
venture by intent are missing in the present situation. 
1. There was no element of loss. 
Bitner Co. entered into the Real Est. Contract (Ex. 23P) under which 
Westcor agreed to pay Bitner Co. $400,000.00 for title to the land in Park 
Ridge. That $400,000.00 was due and payable whether or not Westcor succeeded 
in developing and marketing Park Ridge. Any failure of Westcor or Monson to 
make whatever profit they expected from their development of Park Ridge would 
not result in a loss of any sort to Bitner Co. 
While there were ancilliary agreements to the Real Est. Agre<"ment, 
(considered as one agreement in the trial), none of those agreements placed 
any affirmative obligation on Bitner Co., and none of them required Bitner Co. 
to share in any losses. (See Ex. 23P) Indeed, the subsequent agreements were 
designed solely to provide an opportunity for Blaine Bitner and other individ-
uals (not the companies) to obtain finders' fees by assisting Westcor to fino 
buyers for the Jots, since these persons already knew of some prospects. (Ex. 
23P, Tr. 511-15) 
The clause in the Real Est. Contract allowing Bitner Co. to share in 
any savings on the development of Park Ridge added to the possibility of f,,r 
ther income for Bitner Co. but did not create any possibility of loss tc• 
Bitner Co. The clause simply meant that if Westcor were able to save monev on 
the improvements so that the improvements cost less than anticipated, Westcor 
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would pay Bitner Co. more money for the land itself. It was the sole obliga-
tinn of l'.estcor to pay and bear all development costs, all sales costs and all 
0 1ner costs relating to the development of Park Ridge. (Ex. 23P) 
As this Court found in Bassett: 
While the agreement to share losses need not necessarily be 
stated in specific terms, the agreement must be such as L 
permit the courts to infer that the parties intended to share 
losses as well as profits. 
Bassett, supra, 530 P.2d at 2. There is nothing in the Real Est. Contract 
that allows any inference whatsoever that Bitner Co. would share losses or 
costs of development with Westcor. Since Bitner Co. was party to a straight-
forward, uniform Real Est. Contract, it could sue Westcor for any failure by 
~estcor to meet the terms of the sale; Bitner Co. could obtain damages to 
cover its losses or regain the property in order to avoid any loss because of 
a failure or default by Westcor. In the absence of the element of loss, then, 
there was no joint venture between Bitner Co. and Westcor or its principal 
1.1onson. 
2. There was no profit sharing. 
Rogers' contention that the price of the land in the sale to Westcor 
was based on sharing expected profits from the development of Park Ridge so 
that the simple sales agreement should be considered to be sharing of profits 
111 the nature of a joint venture ignores the fact that Westcor was obligated 
to pay Bitner Co. the total purchase price for the land no matter what the 
f1nanc1al results of the development to Westcor would be. Thus, the purchase 
:
1 r"e to be paid by Westcor was not a sharing of profits. (Ex. 23P) 
During the trial Rogers made great issue of the tax planning aspects 
"1 the sale, with the apparent hope of showing that the sale was illusory and 
reflected a mere contribution of assets. This argument is strained and 
fallacious. The tax planning done by Bitner Co. is common, legal and 
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perfectly legitimate grounds to motivate Bitner Co. not to proceed with anv 
joint venture or other transaction that might have been considered. The sale 
was a sale. Why the sellers chose the form of sale they did is irrelevant tr, 
that fact that the choice was made and reduced to writing. 
the best evidence of the transaction it memorialized. (Ex. 23P} 
3. Bitner Co. had no control over the development. 
That writing 
Other elements of a joint venture by intent enumerated by this Court 
are missing from the relationship between Bitner Co. and Westcor and Monson. 
Blaine Bitner and witness Roger Bitner testified without contradiction that 
Bitner Co. and Blaine Bitner as an individual had no right to control the 
development of the subdivision and that Westcor did intend it to have any 
control. (Tr. 140, 524-25, 904) Bitner Co. derived no control over Park 
Ridge from the separate relationship Excavation Co. developed with Westcor as 
a subcontractor at Park Ridge. Westcor or Monson did hire the separate and 
independent Excavation Co. to install improvements at Park Ridge, but 
Excavation Co. had no power or control over the project. It is the uncontro-
verted testimony of Blaine Bitner, president of Excavation Co. and of Roger 
Bitner, who signed the contract on behalf of Excavation Co. (Ex. 1020) and was 
actually engaged in the work, that Excavation Co. was not hired for the job 
nor allowed to begin work upon the site until August 29, 1979. Excavation Co. 
was hired and allowed to work at the site only after reaching a contractural 
agreement with Westcor and Monson about what work Excavation Co. would per-
form. (J,s!.} 
Thus, the trial court's contention that all improvement was done b-. 
Bitner Co. or persons under contract with it is simply not substantiated 111 
any way by the record. (Finding R. 717 #13) 
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It is thus clear and uncontroverted on the record that Excavation 
r.o. (which is not the same as or an alter ego for Bitner Co.) entered a sepa-
• ate understanding with Westcor-Monson to provide certain excavating services 
•o• which Excavation Co. was to be paid certain sums by Westcor. (Tr. 140, 
0114) Excaviltion Co.'s purely contractual obligations to perform services 
cannot be attr.outed to Bitner Co. and do not entangle Bitner Co. into any new 
relationship with Westcor or Monson. The trial court's assumption that the 
excavating services performed by an independent company were related to the 
sale of property by another company is clearly erroneous. The two companies 
are not only separate legal entities, but the trial court had no grounds for 
looking beynn-i their legal status. 
4. Bitner Co. did not control the finances. 
It is also clear from the record and the documents that Bitner Co. 
had no control over the finances for the development of Park Ridge. All sales 
in the development were made in the name of Westcor, and all accounts receiv-
able from those sales were payable to Westcor. Bitner Co. was not a party to 
any of those agreements and was not a payee under any of them. (See, inter 
~- Exs. 290-360, 400, 770-880) 
I. The relevant documents disprove any joint venture by intent. 
The plaintiffs emphasize the fact that Bitner Co. signed the Escrow 
Agreement with the County, alleging that Agreement evidences Bitner Co.'s 
alleged status as a joint venturer. The record shows that Westcor made all 
c0ntact relevant to the establishment of the Escrow Agreement. (Tr. 432-33) 
In its Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Bitner Co. stated that 
the signing " ••• was done only to satisfy the Summit County requirements 
"use fee title [to Park Ridge] had not passed to Westcor, Inc., at that 
time.•• (R. 677; see also Tr. 220-21) 
-15-
Rogers did not contradict this 
statement even though the question as to why Bitner Co. signed the Escrow 
Agreement was raised at the trial. The Escrow Agreement, then, is not pconf 
of a joint venture. 
Throughout the trial, as the trial court examined any relationship 
between Bitner Co. and Westcor or Monson, Rogers demanded that the Real Est. 
Contract (with the ancilliary agreements), must be allowed to speak for them-
selves, and so they do. (Tr. 355-56, 360, 525; see Ex. 23P) It is the very 
agreements to which Rogers referred, (Ex. 23P) which contain no provision and 
not even any inference that Westcor intended to share losses with Bitner Co. 
The agreements obviate any argument that Bitner Co. had any control over the 
development or the finance of Park Ridge after the signing of those agree-
ments. Rogers should be held to his own evidentiary demands, and on those 
demands, he loses his claim. 
B. There is no concrete averment nor substantiated finding of fact which 
would allow the trial court to find a joint venture between Bitner Co. 
and Westcor or Monson as to Rogers under the theory of joint venture by 
estoppel toward third parties. 
The trial court, in finding an alleged joint venture between Bitner 
Co. and Westcor or Monson, appears to rely primarily on the documentation 
discussed above. However, the trial court also makes some references to sur-
rounding circumstances and appearances, which, though ambiguous, may have 
suggested to the trial court that it could find a joint venture by es toppel tu 
a third party. That conclusion does not, however, withstand scrutiny. 
A joint venture by estoppel toward a third party occurs when, 
despite the intent of parties, their actions lead a third party first, to 
believe that the requirements for a joint venture between the alleged 101nl 
venturers have been met, second, to place reasonable reliance on those appear 
ances, and third, to act upon that reasonable reliance to its detriment. 46 
Am. Jur. 2d §9, pp. 30-31. 
This Court has accepted the doctrine of estoppel and has said: 
We do not question the soundness of that doctrine under proper 
circumstances. But it is a doctrine of equity which the plain-
tiff could claim the benefit of only by showing the facts re-
quired to justify its application. These would include that the 
defendants were aware of all the material facts; that in such 
awareness they made the promise when they knew that the plain-
tiff was acting in reliance on it; that the latter, observing 
reasonable care and prudence, acted in reliance on the promise 
and got into a position where it suffered a loss. 
Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 15 Ut.2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 
(Utah 1964). Those conditions are not met by Rogers here, and the trial 
court's conclusion that there was a joint venture is clearly erroneous. 
Rogers and his wife both admitted that from 1979 through early 1980 
both of them relied entirely on Westcor. Rogers' reliance on Westcor was 
justified by the sales agreement with Westcor alone. Rogers planned the con-
struction of the houses, the obtaining of construction loans and the planned 
sales of the houses when only Westcor was on the scene. Cross-examination of 
Rogers elicited the following admissions: 
Q Did he [" representative of Westcor] eve« indicate to you 
that there was any kind of a contract between Westcor and 
Milton O. Bitner Company? 
A No. 
Q Did he ever indicate to you that Westcor and Milton O. 
Bitner Company were either partners or joint ventures in 
this project? 
A No. 
Q Did he make any representations to you that Westcor was in 
fact the developer? 
A At that time, yeah. That is what I understood anyway. 
Q In your conversations with Mr. Bitner on the construction 
site, did he P er indicate to you that Milton O. Bitner 
Company and Westcor were partners or joint venturers? 
A No. 
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Q Did he ever indicate to you by what authority Bitner 
Excavating was putting in improvements? 
A No. 
Q Did he ever indicate that he was operating under contract 
from Westcor? 
A Blaine didn't, no. 
Q So it is your testimony then that you observed the improve-
ments going in but you had no idea who was putting them in 
or by what authority? 
A I know who was putting them in. 
Q All right. Let me reword that. You had no idea who was 
responsible ultimately for putting them in 7 
A Well, at the very early stage of it I assumed that Westcor 
had the responsibility to do it. 
Q How early? 
A Oh, all the way up to probably have to be maybe right in 
July and August of '79. 
Q And what did you base that assumption on 7 
A Well, just through conversations, really. 
Q Do you remember with who? 
A No. Well, let's see, I am losing track now. 
Q Is it your conversation, your testimony then that you went 
for a period of three months, you obtained a large con-
struction loan and then you proceeded ahead on mnstruction 
for maybe two or three months or possibly even longer before 
you had any idea who the developer was and who was respon-
sible for putting in the improvements? 
A No, that is not right. I knew who the developer was. 
Q Okay. Well, then that was my question. 
out who the developer was 1 
When did you find 
A Well, at the time that closed out the loan or even, yeah 
I guess it was about the time when we closed out the loan. 
Q So was it Mr Hunt that you found that out from, or was it 
Mr. Kilbourne? 
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A It might have been Kilbourne. am not too sure of that. 
Q Did Mr. Kilbourne or Mr. Hunt ever indicate to you that 
Michael !sic, Milton] O. Bitner Company was either the 
developer or had responsibility for putting in the im-
provements' 
A No. Not at this time, no. 
Irr. 96-99, see, also Tr. 642-43, Tr. 741) 
In early 1980, Westcor had defaulted as to Rogers because the im-
provements Westcor had promised were not installed. Westcor had also 
defaulted as to Bitner Co. under the Real Est. Contract. Wes tcor was then 
negotiating its way out of the Real Est. Contract, and the Trust Agreement was 
being developed as the vehicle to resolve that problem with Bitner Co. 
Rogers learned from other purchasers that they were planning to 
bring suit pursuant to the Escrow Agreement with Summit County. Rogers, 
despite this information, took no action. he never even checked on the status 
of the Escrow Agreement. (Tr. 740-44) 
Because of the disputes raised by the other purchasers and because 
of Westcor's various defaults, Bitner Co. funded the extended Escrow Agreement 
and also s19ned the Trust Agreement with Westcor, hoping to be able to protect 
the value of the lar.d which would thereupon revert to it because of Westcor's 
breach. Bitner Co. had been induced by Westcor to sign the Escrow Agreement 
in the first place because Bitner Co. understood that the original seller of 
the land was required by the County to sign the Escrow Agreement. When a 
Lourt order enforcing the Escrow Agreement as to the County was obtained, 
Kiinn Co. was required by its earlier signature to make the improvements at 
Blaine Bitner testified why Bitner Co. signed the 
original Escrow Agreement: 
Q Nine davs later you signed an escrow fund agreement with 
Summit County, though didn't you? 
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A That is right. They [Westmr I came back to us and said th"'r 
had to have it. 
Q And then two months or so later you signed protective cove 
nants with Summit County? 
A Whatever was needed, why that was handled through th<" 
[Westcor's I attorney. 
Q And Summit County told you you had to sign that, too? 
A That is right. 
Q As landowners? 
A As the original fee holder. 
Q Even though you didn't have any of the property any mor<>' 
A That is right. 
Q Isn't it true that you really did want to keep a finger in 
the pie? 
A No, we didn't. We wanted to get rid of it because we were 
interested in other, we had, I had plenty of work to do. 
was working in the livesto~k and those of you that know, it 
is a 24-hour emergency. Constantly. 
(Tr. 221-22) Bitner Co., because it had sold the land and signed the Escro~ 
Agreement was, in effect, being forced to cure the breach and default by 
Westcor. 
At some time, after realizing Westcor's defaults, Rogers contacted 
Blaine Bitner to complain of Westcor's default. Blaine Bitner responded that 
he guessed something would have to be done. But by that time, Rogers had 
already taken all his actions to build the houses in reliance on Westcnr. 
Bitner Co. had no relationship or responsibility to Rogers at that time o·· 
before that time. Bitner Co.'s only responsibility thereafter arose from thr 
Escrow Agreement and was limited only to the terms and requirements of lha 
Agreement as interpreted through the judgment in the case brought by oliic' 
purchasers. Lynn, et al. v. Westcor, et al., Third District Summit Co. (Civil 
No. 5985, 1980) 
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The trial court, however, may have decided that there was reliance 
''" Rogers and seems to convince itself of this conclusion primarily because 
111d1ne Bitner appeared from time to time at the development site and because 
he was the president of Excavation Co. which was doing part of the work there 
under contract with Westcor. (Findings, R. 717 #13) Rogers never claimed 
that he relied on these appearances. 
Blaine Bitner's appearances at the development site were either 
those of an interested creditor, concerned with whether or not the party with 
which Bitner Co. stood in a contractural obligation was going to be able to 
pay Bitner Co. for the land or those of the president of Excavation Co., which 
had a separate contractual duty to perform excava, rig services. It is not 
unusual for the principal of a creditor company, especially when the creditor 
is the seller of land, to be interested in the progress of the debtor's busi-
ness operations, as it is not uncommon for a creditor to examine his debtor's 
operatic s, assessing the debtor's ability to repay the debt. 
Blaine Bitner's vists to the site as president of Excavation Co. no 
more created the appearance of a joint venture than would the appearance of 
any other creditor or contractor on the site of a developer. There is no 
allegation in the complaint and no factual statement or evidence in the trial 
testimony to show that Rogers was even aware that Bitner Co. existed when 
Rugers first saw Blaine Bitner at the site or even at the time Rogers began to 
realize that Westcor would probably !"IOI succeed in providing the improvements 
'>'lestcor alone had promised. 
Joint ventureship by estoppel, as in any other case of estoppel, 
m:.st arise from a reasonable expectation based on promises or appearances. 
The only reasonable appearance was that Excavation Co. was a contractor to 
~estcor, the party with whom Rogers had a contractural relationship. Rogers 
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could see that Westcor had engaged Excavation Co. to perform services, Roger, 
had no reason to see or infer anything other than that. Seeing Blaine Bitner 
supervise excavating work would not suggest to a reasonable person that 1, 
could rely on an excavator as a joint venturer. 
The record also shows that Rogers made little or no effort to deter 
mine Westcor's standing or to determine why or whether Westcor would or woulc 
not be able to complete development of the subdivision improvements it har: 
promised, even though other purchasers had told Rogers of the Escrow Agreement 
and their planned suit. Rogers admitted that he had not asked Summit Count, 
who was the escrow guarantor of the development until well after he had 
decided to buy the lots and build the houses and had obtained loans and begun 
the construction. (Tr. 741-44) Bitner Co. was nowhere present on the pro-
ject. Any reasonable investigation by Rogers would have revealed the relation-
ship among the parties with whom he had contact, ~' Westcor and Excavation 
Co. 
To sustain an allegation of joint venture by estoppel toward a third 
party, Rogers (as the third party) must allege and prove that he acted in 
reliance on the existence of the alleged joint venture in taking actions 
leading to the losses. Rogers may not, after having acted and sustained 
damage, piece together information to allege the creation of a joint venture 
relationship. Hindsight will not create actual reliance to prove an estoppel. 
Rogers cannot create such obi igations from whole cloth and then use the crea-
tion to prove a joint venture by estoppel reliance. Rogers and Mrs, Roger' 
did not so rely. Like Rogers, Bitner Co. was caught by Westcor's breachfi 
Being a fellow victim with Rogers, however, no more makes Bitner Co. a 1oi11I 
venturer with Westcor than Rogers himself was. 
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c. The plaintiffs were not intended third party beneficiaries of the 
purported trust agreement between Bitner Co. and Westcor. 
This brief uses the term "intended beneficiary" rather than the 
olrler "creditor third party beneficiary" to refer to third party benefici-
0 r1es, who as a matter of law, may obtain direct benefit of an agreement to 
which they are not promisees. "Creditor" beneficiary is a term of art, which, 
as this court noted in Clark v. American Standard Inc., 583 P.2d 618, 620 
!Utah 1978), is confusing. Simply being a creditor in the debtor-creditor 
<ense is not enough to make such a creditor an intended third party bene-
i1c1ary. As this Court stated in Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. First Security 
~~· 9 Ut. 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959), an intended beneficiary arises 
" ... where, from the nature of the contract, it is plainly evident to the 
promissor that the contract is for the benefit of third parties ••• " (Emphasis 
added.) The trial court in this case simply used the term "third party bene-
ficiaries", leaving unclear what brought it to find intended beneficiaries. 
Bitner Co. did not create or agree to any document or take any action which 
made Rogers an intended beneficiary. 
I. The Trust Agreement was void due to failure of a condition subseguent. 
Paragraph 6 of the Trust Agreement between Bitner Co. and Westcor 
1Ex. 28P) contains a cnndition subsequent which must be fulfilled or the agree-
ment (and hence the Hold Harmless Clause) becomes null and void. The Trust 
Agreement provides: 
6. Bitner and Westcor agree to both use their best efforts 
in obtaining clear title and possession of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts on the aforementioned lots. If said contracts 
cannot be recovered by November 15, 1980, this agreement shall 
become null and void, the original contract shall become in full 
force, and all amounts received and disbursed by Davis shall be 
accounted for and applied against the original contract, and all 
items assigned to Davis shall be assigned back to Westcor. 
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Bitner Co. testified that the condition subsequent had not been 
fulfilled and that Bitner Co. considered the agreement null and void. Blaine 
Bitner testified on direct examination: 
Q You're holding Westcor harmless right now, aren't you? 
A No. And that was, when that agreement was signed, I would 
have to ask Mr. Davis, but there is a stipulation in there 
that if certain things weren't done within thirty days that 
was null and void, and that is what I told you previously. 
(Tr. 226) Blaine Bitner continued: 
Q Why didn't you file anything against them in this lawsuit? 
If they cheated you and double-crossed you why are you still 
standing on the same side of the fence as Westcor, if they 
are the ones you did the damage? 
THE WITNESS: We don't, we don't hold them harmless. We, I 
contradict you on that. 
(Tr. 227, 228) 
Since the condition required Westcor's best efforts and it is evi-
dent that Westcor did nothing, Bitner Co. is correct despite Manson's testi-
mony that Westcor disagreed. The inactions of Westcor cannot be overcome by 
the mere assertions of Manson's opinion. Because of the obvious conflict 
between the views of Bitner Co. and Westcor, their joint counsel did nothing 
more to strengthen the record. (See Section Ill below.) But on the prepon-
derance of evidence in the record, the trial court could properly find only 
that the Agreement between Bitner Co. and Westcor is null and void as a matter 
of law. Thus, no Trust Agreement (or Hold Harmless Clause) exists under which 
Westcor can be held harmless by Bitner Co. or under which Rogers may claim to 
be a third party beneficiary. An agreement which is null and void also cannot 
support a joint venture theory. 
-24-
2. Even if the Trust Agreement is not null and void, the enforcement of the 
Hold Harmless Clause cannot be enforced to exculpate Westcor and Monson 
from their own wrongful and fraudulent acts. 
The trial court found that Westcor had failed to fund the Escrow 
Agreement guaranteeing the completion of improvements in Park Ridge. l~inding 
R. 717 #14) It also found that Westcor was a "show" corporation without 
proper capitalization (Finding, R. 719 #19) and that Monson and Westcor had 
diverted funds received from payments on contracts on lots sold in Park Ridge 
"' other business enterprises or to purposes having nothing to do with Park 
Rirlge, despite the fact that Westcor's obligations at Park Ridge were unpaid 
or· otherwise unsatisfied. (Finding R. 719 #20) The t~ial court also found, 
specifica .y in regard to Rogers, that Westror and Monson had made ? 0 ' >gnments 
or purported assignments of contracts or deeds on the lots Rogers had bought, 
which assignments had nu validity whatsoever at any time. (Finding R. 726 
#43) The trial court also found that Westcor and Monson had clouded the title 
to the Rogers' property by those fraudulent assigr rits and thus quieted 
title in Rogers. (Finding R. 732 # 15) The findings show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that Westcor and Monson were g•. y of fraud. (Finding R. 
724 ##34, 35) The trial court specifically found no fraudulent acts whatso-
ever on the part of the principals of Bitner Co. There was no evidence at 
all, let alone clear or convincing evidence, that B 1aine Bitner, as principal 
and only actor for Bitner Co., did anything wrong, let alone anything fraud-
ulent. (Finding R. 734 #21) Hence, there was no evidence of fraud committed 
by Bitner Co. itself. 
The trial court, in finding Rogers to be a third party beneficiary 
of the Trust Agreement, would allow Rogers to recover against Bitner Co. in 
place of Monson or Westcor, who themselves are barred from recovering under 
the Trust Agreement because of their own fraud. To allow Westcor or Monson to 
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be exculpated from their wrongful and fraudulent acts and to be held harrnles 1 
of those acts offends public policy. While a party may contract out of it. 1 
negligence, it cannot contract out of fraud; fraud involves a high degree of 
intent, wrongfulness and distasteful activity for which the defrauder rnust 
bear its own responsibility. In Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 
19711), this Court stated: 
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will pro-
tect a person against his own fraud as a matter of public 
policy. A contract limitation ••• is valid only in the absence 
of allegations or proof of fraud. 
The Hold Harmless Clause simply cannot be used to exonerate Westcor 
and Monson, even if the Trust Agreement were not a nullity. To allow a third 
party beneficiary to recover when his promisee cannot recover allows the 
promisee to escape the consequences of his fraudulent acts as much as if the 
promisee were able to recover directly. Such a recovery by a third party is 
equally in violation of equitable principles. Indeed, at that level, there 1s 
no Hold Harmless Clause. If the Trust Agreement is not null and void, it is 
valid and operative only within the limits that the law and public policy 
permit. 
Alleged third party beneficiaries can take no greater benefit than 
the actual parties to such an agreement. They have nothing more than the 
original contract promised. Once the trial court found fraud had been 
committed by Monson and Westcor, Monson and Westcor were outside the limits of 
the Hold Harmless Clause, and so were any potential third party beneficiaries. 
This is particularly true on the explicit finding that the representatives of 
Bitner Co. were innocent of fraud and committed no wrongful acts. Any t•1n' 
of fraud against Bitner Co. can come only through the alledged but unsubstan-
tiated claims of partnership with Westcor. Rogers' remedy, then, lies against 
Westcor and Monson; that Rogers has won, and that portion of the judgment 
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awarding Rogers damages against Westcor and Monson should not be disturbed. 
1,,deed, Rogers' remedy there is direct and clear; it need not be padded or 
2 r111anced by a spurious attempt to ensnare Bitner Co. into paying for the fraud 
of others. 
3, Even if the Trus Agreement were valid (which Bitner Co. does not 
concede), the plaintiffs are not, as a matter of law, intended third party 
beneficiaries of that contract who could directly enforce the Hold 
Harmless Clause of the Trust Agreement against Bitner Co. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Hold Harmless Clause in the Trust 
Agreement were valid and could have been enforced by Westcor, Rogers is merely 
an "incidental" beneficiary to it. In Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Ut.2d 
418, 420, 446 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1968), this ( ourt cited with approval 
Corbin's illustration describing incidental third party oeneficiaries: 
Where A owe> money to creditor C or several creditors, and B 
promises A to supply him with money necessary to pay such debts, 
no creditor may maintain a suit against B on this promise. 
Corbin's illustration is exactly the same as the relationship between Roge~s 
and Bitner Co. if the Trust Agreement were not null and void. Bitner Co. had, 
at most, promised under the Tr .isl Agreement to pay Westa>r should claims arise 
out of the situation described in the Trust Agreement. Thus, Rogers, as 
creditors to Westcor, cannot maintain suit against Bitner Co. because of its 
Corbin-like promise. 
4. The Trust Agreement and the joint venture theory are not supported by any 
collateral estoppel theory. 
Rogers and Bennett both attempted to introduce into trial a discus-
'""' of the Lynn case, Lynn et al. v. Westcor, et al.. 3rd District Summit 
Dunty, (unreported, Civil No. <985, 1980) involving only the Escrow Agree-
'11ent. Though their intent in introducing the case is ambiguous, they seem to 
"rque that the decision in the unrelated case creates collateral estoppel 
•hich prevents Bitner Co. from arguing the nullity of the Trust Agreement or 
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proving that there was no 101nt venture. 
case in its findings of fact. (F1nc11ngs, R, 717-18 •15) Howevt>r, no par•,, 
neitht>r Ro(_Jers nor BennPtt, alle~1erl collateral estopµeJ in the comµla1r1t 
the cross-claim. They proffered no evidence at trial to show that an equ1\,.... 
tent damage situation 1n 1=_yri_r1 to create collateral estoppel, If, ancJ to th, 
extt-nt, the trial court relied on any collateral estoppel theory, it errerl 1r 
doing so, because no orders or rulings in that case and no evidence or aver 
ment that the factual situation was 1dent1cal to that controlling this c;is, 
was proffered in evidence, Thus, any finding based on Lynn should be ignored. 
If such a finding was of substantial help to the trial judge in reach111,1 
conclusions of law and fact, such a finding constitutes reversible error, 
D, If, as the trial court found, Rogers is a third party beneficiary of th. 
Escrow Agreement, Rogers' rights of enforcement under that agreement are 
only equal to those of Summit County and do not extend to an action fur 
consequential damages. 
It is black letter law that the rights of a third party benefic1an 
to an agreement do not and cannot exceed the rights accorded the main part1e> 
to t ht> agreement. In Cnnt inPntal Bank dnd Trust Ccrnp~ny v. R. W. Stew a~, 4 
Ut. 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 1955), this Court found a right of thir" 
party to enforce a contract. However, the Court specifically held thdt th, 
third party could not recover more than that which was due and recoverable h1 
the original promisee. The Court stated· 
The ta .. is well settled that the rights of a third person to sue 
on a contract made for his benefit depend on the terms of th~ 
agreement and are not greater than those of the promisee. 
The trial recorc shows that Summit County, exercising its reasonah1· 
discretion. extended its Escrow Agreement with Bitner Co. beyond the or1<J1r' 
24 months. Bitner Co., to the extent it was required by the County to P"' 
form, did so within the alto .. ed extension. There was thus no uncured breac 1• 
'" R1tner Co. to the County, and no question of further action to be 'aken by 
County. 
The Escrow Agreement between Bitner Co. and Summit County was lim-
,te·l 1n nature. The County could require only that the monies held in the 
'""'" fund be used to complete subdivision improvements if the improvements 
•ere not finished by the time specified in the Escrow Agreement or in its 
The Escrow Agreement did not foresee or create other causes of 
"r11on and does not purport to allow consequential damages. The Escrow 
\greement was designed solely to provide for improvements when and if the 
'"'provements had not been completed.* 
Since the object of the Escrow Agreement is to assure that improve-
ments will be made, the interest of the purchaser in any lot in a subdivision 
s that they be made and that the purchaser himself not be obligated to pay 
'or them. If the County must exercise its rights under the Escrow Agreement, 
is right is to cause improvements to be made. The funds being held are re-
1uire<1 in order to prevent the County from incurring loss in requiring the 
improvements to be made. The County cculd use the escrow funds to reimburse 
iselt for its use of its own employees and equipment if it decided to install 
the improvements or, in the more usual case, to pav an independent contractor 
:u make the improvements. 
The true third party beneficiarv to such an Escrow Agreement is the 
'"1ependent entity which becomes engaged to make the improvements at the 
~ 1 e'I of the County if there is a failure by the obligee. The County's job 
!: appears that the result of the Lynn case, in which the County was made a 
mandatory party, was a new escrow agreement between Bitner Co. and the 
I ounty. The County was sat1Sfied with the result in that case and witr the 
"' t1011s carried out as a result of it. The County felt no f~rther need to 
dd and has taken no further act pursuant to the Escrow Agreement. 
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is to see that the improvements are done at no cost to the purchaser and at nn 
cost to itself and to see that the costs are paid to the entity who did the 
work or supplied any materials necessary to the improvements. The County '' 
not and cannot be concerned with alleged consequential damages; it insures 
that the improvements will be made by requiring an escrow fund; it neither 
does, nor has an obligation to, insure against anything else. The County 
itself suffers no damage from delay; so long as it has funds to provide for 
improvements at no cost to itself or a purchaser of an unimproved lot who also 
purchases the promise that there will be improvements, the County has satis-
fied itself and any regulations it may have with regard to the improvement of 
land. 
In this case, Rogers did not pay for the improvements or any of the 
materials that went into them. He thus cannot stand in the County's shoes tu 
collect the costs of improvements against the escrow fund; Rogers' sole 
recourse lies against Westcor and Monson in a simple contract action. Upon 
the completion of the subdivision improvements, the Escrow Agreement was 
fulfilled and no other right or obligations between the parties pertained. 
E. The Trial Court Erred in Calculating Damages to Rogers. 
Even if this Court should determine that Bitner Co. is somehow 
liable to Rogers for damages allegedly arising from delays in completion of 
improvements, any damages awarded must be properly calculated. The award by 
the trial court is too high and should be reduced. Rogers claimed damages for 
loss of profit on Earnest Money Contracts made to sell the houses he construc-
ted because of the alleged failure of Westcor to perform contractural obliga-
tions timely. Had Westcor performed, Rogers would have made a profit based 
upon the Earnest Money Agreements with the prospective buyers. (Findings R. 
722 #30) 
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Those Earnest Money Agreements were binding contractural obliga-
tions, subject only to the condition that the improvements of the subdivision 
1e completed, which was the obligation of Westcor. It was upon failure of the 
'arnest Money Agreements that Rogers' cause of action arose. Rogers' two 
contracts were to sell the two homes (which he said cost him $105,419.95 and 
Si06,689.00), for $130,000.00 each. By the terms of the Earnest Money 
Contracts, then, Rogers had contracted for sales which wculd have given them 
profits of $47,891.05. 
Rogers should not, as a matter of equity and law, be allowed to 
purport that other, unproven contractural agreements could have been entered 
into because Rogers would have had no opportunity to enter into later con-
tractural agreements without breaching the existing ones. The possibilities 
of making such new contracts are speculative on their face, and thus an 
inadequate basis for alleged damages. 
To the extent Bitner Co. may be, despite the arguments already 
raised, liable for any damages to the plaintiffs, those damages should be 
calculateci on the realities of the contractural situation existing when this 
cause of action arose, not on hypothetical damages based on an inflated, sub-
sequent appraisal. Had there been no breach, Rogers' profits were fixed by 
his own agreements at $47,891.05. Rogers should not be permitted to increase 
the benefits of his own bargain at the expense of Bitner Co., which never had 
any direct obligation to Rogers. Furthermore, the obligation of a party who 
'' being damaged by a breach of contract is to mitigate his damages, not to 
"ornate t11em. 
Rogers did, of course, mitigate by selling. The eventual buyers of 
the property were those very same persons who had entered into the original 
Earnest Money Agreements. To purport that they would have paid a higher price 
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than what they had originally bargained to pay only a few months after the 
Earnest Money Agreements were signed is pure speculation, just as it is pur" 
speculation to daim that other, unknown persons would have bought despite the 
well-known problems in the housing market. 
The maximum permissible award to Rogers, then, is the selling price 
under the earnest money agreements ($260,000.00 on the houses and two lots) 
minus the mitigating, actual sale price ( $2 12, 108. 95) on the two houses and 
lots), or $4 7, 89 1. O 5. The judgment should, at minimum, be reduced to that 
amount, and interest recalculated on the basis of the reduced figure. 
II. THE TRIAL CX>URT ERRED IN HOLDING BITNER CX>. JOINTLY AND SEVERAU Y 
LIABLE WITH DEFEl'..[)ANTS YESTCX>R, M)N5()N Af\D BADCER TO BENl'ETT. 
To find Bitner Co. jointly and severally liable to Bennett, the 
trial court had to find that either there was some privily of contract among 
Bitner Co., Westcor, Monson and Badger with regard to Bennett and his loan or 
that the Trust Agreement created an intended third party beneficiary interest 
in Bennett as to Bitner Co. A I though the trial court is less than clear on 
the law, it seems to have found liability primarily on the basis of the second 
theory. Nonetheless, neither theory was proven on the facts. 
A. There was no Joint Venture of Intent. 
Bitner has argued above under sections I A and I B, that there was 
never a joint venture of any kind between Bitner Co. and Westcor or Monson. 
It reincorporates those arguments with direct reference to Bennett's cross-
claim and respectfully refers the Court to them. Those arguments are <even 
stronger with regard to Bennett who never had any contact with Park Ridge; ht 
merely loaned money to Westcor, Monson and Badger who purported to asS19 11 
contracts to secure the loan. Bitner Co. incurred no risks of loss and nl 
profits from dealing with Bennett and had no control of any sort over any loan 
from Bennett. Bennett's transactions meet none of the joint venture criteria 
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recogn 1 zed by this Court with regard to Bitner Co. Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 
111tah 1974). 
There was no joint venture by estoppel toward a third party in regard to 
Bennett. 
Bennett made no claim and offered no proof that a joint venture by 
estoppel toward a third party was created am< g Bitner Co., Westcor, Monson 
and Badger by the actions of those parties. (See Tr. 840-60) In his second 
amended answer and cross-claim, Bennett did not allege that the Westcor, 
Monson and Badger partnership represented to him that they or any one of them 
were engaged in any joint venture or partnership with Bitner Co. He made no 
prr"er of evidence at trial that Westcor. Monson and Badger stated or even 
felt that they were acting other than for themselves individually or as a 
partne ship comprised only of themselves in obtaining loans from Bennett. 
"Jeither Bennett nor anyone else offered any evidence or made any allegation 
that Bennett thought otherwise when he made the loans. 
Bennett, the former president of a major bank. described himself as 
a sophisticated investor. He testified with satisfaction about his successful 
efforts to obtain the signatures of Monson for Westcor and of Badger individ-
ually, to assure himself of Badger's personal liability and obligation on his 
loans to Wes!cor, Monson and Badger. (Tr. 854) He did not want liability 
1ust from Westcor and Badger's now defunct corporations, but the liability of 
1heir principals as well. Bennett neither saw nor could allege that he 
thought there was privily or any other relations~·'P with or between Bitner Co. 
dnd his loans. Indeed, in the trial court's findings of fact and law, it is 
•indear whether the trial judge found any privity which would have made Bitner 
Co. jointly and severally liable for the debts of Westcor, Monson ana Badger. 
!See, Findings, R. 725-29) However, any ambiguity which exists in this regard 
must be resolved in favor of Bitner Co. 
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C. Even if a formal joint venture based on the documents could be found_ 
there is no evidence or finding that Westcor' Monson and Badger WP/ e 
acting in behalf of such an alleged joint venture when they obtained , 
loan from Bennett. 
While it is clear in the law that any partner acting by himself ma, 
represent and bind the partnership to which he belongs in the course of the 
partnership's business, it does not follow that a partnership or joint venture 
is responsible for all obligations of its venturers. A person may be a part-
ner in several separate partnerships or ventures, and he cannot by himself 
link all his various dealings by the simple fact of the multiplicity of his 
own ventures and activities. A partner in a law firm may enter into a part-
nership or venture with his accountant brother to develop a plot of land into 
condominiums, and he may promise his cut of the profits at the law firm to 
build the condominium, but that does not entitle someone purchasing a condo-
minium unit to sue the law firm because the lawyer and the accountant did not 
pay to put the roof on the condominium, nor can the law finn sue to obtain any 
profits from the construction and sale of the condominium, even if it knew the 
lawyer was making such investments with his cut. Partnership liability does 
not extend nearly so far. 
In this case, Westcor and Monson had an obligation to install cer-
lain improvements in Park Ridge. To obtain financing to fulfill that obliga-
lion, or so Monson testified, (Tr. 285-96) he agreed with Badger to form a 
partnership which would borrow money for that purpose. Bennett neither 
alleged nor attempted to prove through his own testimony that the loans he 
made were made to any person or entity other than Westcor, Monson and Bad[Je< 
or a partnership composed of those three (or any part of them). Thus, even 11 
the alleged joint venture between Bitner Co. and Westcor-Monson ever ex1sto>d 
Bennett's loans were not made to that joint venture, but rather to Westcor ann 
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\\onson (and their partner Badger) to allow Monson and Westcor to fulfill 
~ e• tear's obi i gat ions to make the improvements. 
Bennett's loan to l'testcor-Monson and Badger was, as far as Bennett 
lid' concerned and as far as they were concerned and represented at the time, 
1
,,ade only to those parties. Bennett knew with whom he dealt, and he took 
precautions to protect h1mself--but not with regard to Bitner Co., because it 
was never connected to his loans. 
D. Even if an alleged joint venture including Bitner Co. did exist, the 
actions of Westcor, Monson and Badger in relation to Bennett were, by 
statute, not actions of that joint venture. 
The Uniform Partnership Act of Utah, U. C.A. §ll8-1-6(3)a, states that: 
Unless authorized b-, the other partners ••. one or more but less 
ihan all of the partners have no authority to: 
a. Assign the partnership property in trust for 
creditors •••• 
Monson and Badger, in dealing with Bennett, assigned the alleged 
assets of a partnership in trust for their creditor Bennett. They thu< did 
exactly that which cannot be done without the authority of !!! of the alleged 
partners. Those assets assigned to Bennett were contracts and notes payable 
to Westcor, as previously described. Those assets, which would have been 
assets of any broader partnership if it existed, were assigned to Bennett as a 
creditor and were to be acted upon by the Monson-Badger partnership in trust 
for Bennett. Badger was to arrange to discount and sell those assets to repay 
the loans Bennett had made to Monson, Westcor and Badger. By statute, Bitner 
Co. cannot be found a party to the assignment and trust because Bitner Co. 
oe1ther signed nor consented in any way to the agreement. ~ the partners 
lid opprove the assignment into trust for their creditor Bennett, and all the 
rortners were Westcor, Monson and Badger. The Uniform Partnership Act require-
ments were thus met. Bitner Co. was no part of the whole partnership. 
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Bennett, as a self-described sophisticated businessman and in h11 
actions as he testified to them, in fact acknowledges the statutory limita-
tions when he states that he was careful to require ~ parties, Westcor 
Monson and Badger to sign the note on his loan. (Tr. 853-55) Bennett never 
contemplated any liability or obligation on the part of Bitner Co. when he 
made the loan, and he did not think of it as a partner. The possibility of 
claiming against Bitner Co. was a pleasant afterthought developed by him when 
he learned that a hitherto unheard of entity, "M.O. Bitner Company" had 
originally owned the land at Park Ridge. Since it is evident that Bitner Co. 
never consented to the assignments to Bennett, if Bennett is to claim recovery 
pursuant to those assignments, he must concur with and acknowledge the statu-
tory requirements by asserting that ~ parties to the partnership consented. 
Since he has the acknowledged consent of Westcor, Monson and Badger, he must 
acknowledge that they are the only partners involved. These three, Westcor, 
Monson and Badger, are the partners who oould and did oonsent to the assign-
ment to him in trust as their creditor, just as they were the obligors he 
sought for the loans. 
E. The trial court erred in finding Bennett to be a direct third party 
beneficiary under the Trust Agreement among Bitner Co., Westcor and 
Monson. 
The trial court held that Bennett was an intended primary benefi-
ciary of the Hold Harmless Clause in the Trust Agreement between Bitner Co. 
and Monson. (Findings R. 731 #8) In its reasoning, the trial court stated 
that: 
The other parties to the agreement knew that there might be 
allegations to individuals in the position of Bennett and that 
the agreement would give those in the position of Bennett the 
benefits of promises and representations made by Monson/Westcor. 
(Findings R. 729 #47) (Emphasis added.) While Bitner Co. denies this finding 
of fact, even if it were the case, the trial court erroneously reached the 
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conclusion of law, based on that erroneous finding, that Bennett was an 
intended third party beneficiary of the Hold Harmless Clause of the Trust 
1\ gt-eement. 
The trial court had to use the word "might" because there is no 
evidence in the record to convince it that Bitner Co. knew of the existence, 
nature or extent of Westcor or Mon son's debts and obi igations to Bennett. The 
trial court thus made a finding which is only a guess. Even if Bitner Co. had 
such knowledge, it would not have made Bennett any more than what he was, an 
incidental benef1c ary of the Hold Harmless Clause of the Trust Agreement. If 
a person such as Bennett "might" have been contemplated when the Trust Agree-
ment was made, then there is and can be no direct link between the Trust 
Agreement and Bennett. Bennett is even worse off than Rogers in demonstrating 
that he is beneficiary. Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Ut.2d 418, 446 P.2d 
414, 416 (Utah 1968). The Court is respectfully referred to the discussion in 
sections IB and IC above. 
A hold harmless agreement is subject to a condition subsequent, 
namely. that the party to be held harmless must show a claim by another rele-
vant to and covered by the hold harmless agreement. Bennett's claim is 
totally outside the scope of the Trust Agreement. Furthermore, Bennett cannot 
meet the standards in situations in which this Court did find a third party 
beneficiary to a contract. Jn the Continental Bank case, supra, 4 Ut.2d 228, 
291 P.2d 890 (Utah 1955), the Court found a direct third party beneficiary 
interest in a creditor solely because the debt to the third party was specif-
,._at!y referred to in the agreement between the first and second parties. The 
agreement in that case specified that the first party would pay directly to 
\he third party beneficiary the debts owed by the second party. That created 
a situation in which the third party or the beneficiary was known as a 
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"creditor" beneficiary (or, as this court now describes this relationship, an 
"intended" beneficiary) at the time the two primary parties entered their 
agreement. Bennett and his loan are not mentioned in the Trust Agreement, and 
there is no evidence that Bennett's debt was contemplated by Bitner Co. in 
order to enhance Bennett's status beyond that of an incidental beneficiary. 
Thus, Bennett has no rights or claim under the Trust Agreement. 
F. Even if Bennett were an intended third party beneficiary of the Trust 
Agreement (which he is not), he could not enforce the Agreement because 
the Agreement is specifically unenforceable by Westcor or Monson as to 
their obligation to Bennett. 
The trial court found Westcor and Monson's relationship with Bennett 
fraught with fraud, both in the inception and in the failure to pay their 
obligation to Bennett. (Findings, R. 726-28 #43) Were Monson or Westcor 
allowed to enforce the Hold Harmless Clause of the Trust Agreement against 
Bitner Co. in respect to Westcor's obligation to Bennett, Westcor and Monson 
would be allowed to exculpate themselves from and be held harmless from their 
own fraudulent acts, a result which would violate an express public policy 
against such an occurrence. See Lamb, supra, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). and 
the discussion in Section I C2 above. 
Absent fraud against Bennett by Westcor, Monson and Badger, their 
debts to Bennett would have been fully satisfied by the contracts they 
assigned to Bennett and held in trust for him, as was intended. Thus, the 
debt to Bennett remains unpaid solely because of the fraud of Monson, Westcor 
and Badger. Maintaining joint and several liability in Bitner Co. under a 
hold harmless agreement will allow Monson and Badger to escape unscathed from 
their own evil acts. The result is a gross violation of public policy and an 
offense against equity. The inequitable results of such a holding are doubly 
clear because nowhere in its findings of facts and law did the trial courI 
find that Bitner Co. participated in or was aware of the fraud committed 
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against Bennett, and in its findings of law held that B Jaine Bitner, the 
~rincipal of Bitner Co. (through whom any fraud of Bitner Co. would have been 
committed if such were the case), specifically was not party to any fraud. 
iS~ Findings R. 734 #21) Westcor and Monson cannot be permitted to commit 
fraud with impunity by shifting the costs of fraud to others not part of their 
fraud. 
G. The trial court erred in declaring Bitner Co. jointly and severally liable 
for punitive damages in the amount of $10,000.00 to Bennett, even if 
joint and several liability is upheld as to the rest of Bennett's claim. 
The trial court (R. 739) granted Bennett punitive damages in the 
amount of $10,000.00 because of fraud on the part of Westcor, Monson and 
Badger. However, as noted above, the trial court did not find Bitner Co. 
directly guilty of fraud or even knowledgeable of the occurrence of fraud with 
regard to Bennett's claims. 
The purpose of punitive damages, as their name implies, is to punish 
the intentional wrongful acts of those against whom such damages are levied. 
They provide recoupment for the intangible damages to the victim of wrongful, 
malicious or even criminal actions. They also provide deterrence and assuage 
the public outrage against wrongs such as fraud which are more aggravated 
than, for example, negligence or simple breach of contract. To hold Bitner 
Co. jointly and severally liable for punitive damages is inequitable and 
unjust. Bitner Co. was not a participant in the acts of fraud which punitive 
damages are designed to punish. Awarding such damages to persons or entities 
who did no wrong would detract from their intended effect against Westcor, 
Monson and Badger. The public has no interest in punishing someone who 
committed no wrongful act. Those defendants would not feel the brunt or the 
pun1tivp effect of those damages, but wouid simply expand the number of 
victims to their fraud. 
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The award of an attorney's fee against Bitner Co. is likewise in-
correct. There was no reason under the traditional rules governing attorney's 
fee awards or under any agreement to which Bitner Co. was a party which woulc 
justify such an award, since Bitner Co. was not directly involved in the fraud 
of Westcor, Monson and Badger. Such an award is likewise incorrect as to 
Rogers. 
111. The trial court erred in denying the motions for a mistrial made by 
defendants' counsel John S. Davis when it became clear that he, as 
counsel, could not adequately represent himself, Blaine Bitner, Bitner 
Co. Westcor and Monson because of serious and compelling conflicts of 
interest. 
In the course of the trial, it became clear to Davis, to the Judge 
and to counsel for both Rogers and Bennett that Davis was involved in a ser-
ious conflict of interest in representing more than one defendant. (Tr. 357, 
360, 361, 373, 494, 500, 525-26, 896) As the trial judge commented in 
colloquy during Davis' cross-examination of Blaine Bitner: 
Q Was it ever your impression that Milton 0. Bitner Corpora-
tion was going to assume any previous liability or assump-
tion of risk or anything that had been incurred by Westcor? 
A No. 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor. Your Honor. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. BELNAP: The document speaks for 
itself. 
In addition that question goes right to the heart of 
the potential conflict between Mr. Davis' client. Mr. 
Monson on the stand yesterday testified that that trust 
agreement was in full force and effect in his mind, and that 
it was to hold Westcor harmless from their obligations and 
liabilities arising out of Park Ridge. 
And Mr. Davis we allege, or I allege in this objection, 
in addition to the fact that the document speaks for itself 
is placing now this client in opposition now to his other 
client, which I don't think he should be entitled to do, 
even though he is representing both of them, Your Honor. 
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MR. DAVIS: Just asking his understanding of the inter-
P'Hation of this provision, which they have brought up 
tr ee or four times and hammered away at on the hold harm-
less provision. 
THE COURT: Of a>urse that is not what he is saying, 
and I am not saying you don't have the right to. But they 
have brought that up, except for the fact that you have two 
different parties here and you are asking them the same 
question and gettins conflicting answers on the question. 
MR. DAVIS: Now--
THE COURT: And the question is whether you have the 
right to represent both of the parties. 
ITr. 525-26) The trial court had already stated that: 
THE COURT: \~r. Davis, I think you are treading a very 
fine line as far as the individuals or the corporation, the 
entities you are representing here. I think you've got to 
be very careful in that situation. I think what Mr. Belnap 
says is really true. 
(Tr. 361) Dav is was in fact unable to represent any of the defendants which 
he purported to represent adequdtely. 
Dav is himself was named as a defendant because of his participation 
1n the attempted assignments of contracts which had already been assigned to 
Bennett. The trial a>urt did not award any damages against him. His role was 
µresumably a nominal one, and no one daimed that he was other than a nominal 
defendant. Bt· · with Davis as defendant and as counsel for other defendants, 
no opportunit could be afforded to Bitner Co. (or Westcor and Monson and 
Badger for that matter) to examine in pre-trial or courtroom proceedings 
anything the others knew which might have helped its defense. 
Davis should not have c.ontinued representation of Bitner Co. or of 
·'"Y other defendant whose interests were opposite or inimical to the interests 
of Bitner Co. Rogers and Bennett wanted Bitner Co. to be held party to a 
Ju1nt venture with Westcor and possibly others so they could, inter al~, seek 
Ull1tribution for any liability. Bitner Co., obviously, had an interest in 
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proving its independence from Westcor and Badger in case there had been an, 
damage to Rogers or Bennett. The interest of Bitner Co. is clearly separat. 
and distinct from the interests of Westcor, Monson and Badger. 
Twice in the course of the trial, Davis moved for a mistrial ac, 
to require a new trial with separate counsel for the defendants represented b 
him. (Tr. 500, 896) Davis also moved orally under Rule 63 to have the tria, 
judge recuse himself. The trial court did not follow the procedures set forte 
in Rule 63 and denied that motion at the same time it refused to grant th; 
motion for a mistrial and new trial based on the conflicts among Davis 
clients. (See Tr. 496-502; 895-97) 
The clear conflicts among clients made it impossible for Davis t: 
defend any of them adequately and placed him in a severe and unjustifiabl; 
ethical quandary. His problem was compounded by objections from Rogers' 
counsel and Bennett's counsel that Davis was playing his clients off agains' 
each other in presenting the defense and by comments from the trial cour· 
itself that Davis was walking a very thin line as far as procedure anc 
propriety were concerned. (See Tr. 361) 
In Davis' testimony, he was asked to clarify the relationship amon: 
the defendants he represented. The trial court asked questions, taking him 
beyond the direct questioning of Rogers' counsel so that Davis appears, ir 
response to the Court's questions, to be testifying in behalf of the defen 
dants. It is clear from part of his testimony that he could have assister 
Bitner Co. by testifying directly in its behalf. (See Tr. 1123-25) 
The Canons of Ethics adopted by this Court for the State of Utah, 
Canon 5, Disciplinary Rule 5-102 states that: 
(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending 
I itigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer 
in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his 
client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his 
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firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial, 
except that he may continue the representation and he or a 
lawyer in his firm may testify in the circumstances enumerated 
in DR 5-lOl(B)(l) through (4). 
(BJ If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending 
I itigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer 
in his firm may be called as a witness other than on behalf of 
his client, he may continue the representation until it is 
apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his 
client. 
The trial court, in not granting Davis' motion for a mistrial and in 
equiring him to continu~ to represent those several defendants created a 
situation in which substantial injustice resulted to Bitner Co. (See Davis 
•estimony, Tr. 1123 ~.) 
Canon 5, Disciplinary Rule 5-105 states that: 
fC) In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (BJ, a lawyer 
may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can 
adequate! y represent the interest of each and if each consents 
to the representation after full disclosure of the possible 
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment on behalf of each. 
The language is conjunctive in this Rule. It must be obvious that 
1he counsel can adequate! y represent both parties and the potential problems 
~ust be explained to all parties and their consent for mutual representation 
be obtained. In this case it was obvious that counsel could not represent all 
defendants he purported to represent. Opposing counsel said so, and the trial 
court itself said so. 
Davis's conflicts were particularly harmful to Bitner Co. The 
•eccrci shows that Westcor was defenseless against the charges of both Rogers 
ThPrefore, while it was in the best interest of Bitner Co. that 
" Joint venture be found between it and l'lestcor. as it would be bound to 
arry all financial iiabilities. the case was exactly the opposite for Westcor 
I he same reason. It was to Bitner Co.'s advantage to have the Trust 
''J'ePment declared void for Westcor's failure to meet its terms and 
-43-
conditions. It was Westcor's advantage to be held harmless under that 
Agreement. Most inequitable, Westcor was found directly liable for fraud ,,, 
both Rogers and Bennett. Bitner Co. was found not guilty of any direct fraurl. 
By denying the motions for mistrial, the trial court allowed the 
conflict situation to persist and to cause gross injustice to Bitner Co. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61, this Court may determine 
that a new trial be granted as a result of error of the trial court only ,, 
the error is "inconsistent with substantial justice." Bitner Co.'s not having 
the advantage of representation by independent counsel did result in substan-
tial injustice; that injustice was permitted to develop into full flower b1 
the findings and order of the court below. An initial decision to engage the 
same counsel cannot be permitted to persist to the point of prejudice, 
especially when the problem was so prominent that counsel's testimony is even 
inimical to the interest of one of his clients. (See Tr. 1106-15) 
The trial court apparently denied the motions for mistrial and ne• 
trial because of its concerns for judicial economy. However, the equities of 
the situation make judicial economy secondary to reaching a just and equitable 
solution among the parties. As an alternative remedy, this Court should grant 
Bitner Co. a new trial on any matters not resolved in its favor on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Bitner Co. respectfully requests that ,, 
be relieved from liability as to Rogers and to Bennett and judgment of n, 
liability be entered on its behalf. In the alternative, Bitner Co. seeks " 
new trial. 
proper. 
It also requests such other and further relief as may be just a1" 
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1ated. Salt Lake City, Utah 
March 14, 1984 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
ByWYrf~;f;~~  
M. Karlynn Hinman 
David P. Farnsworth 
-45-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the Brief 
·o A!J[•cal of Defendant-Appellant M.O. Bitner Co. to each of the 
t•Jllowin•~, by United States mail, postage prepaid, this 14th day 
·~· March, 1984: 
George Sutton, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Littlefield & Peterson 
426 South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul M. Belnap, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Bennett 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
F. Alonzo Badger 
694 East 1900 south 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Westcor Inc. 
Douglas Monson 
2090 Cresthill Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111 
~~~· 
